The History of New York State Ethics and Lobbying Commissions: 1906 – Present
1906: The “Anti-Lobby” Law
New York’s first lobbying statute was enacted in 1906 (L. 1906, ch. 321), requiring registration of lobbyists and the reporting of their expenses to the Secretary of State.
1907: The Moreland Act
Formal governmental ethics legislation in New York dates at least to 1907, with the enactment of what is now Section 6 of the Executive Law, empowering the Governor to appoint so-called “Moreland Act Commissions” “to examine and investigate the management and affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state.”
1953: The Special Legislative Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in Government
In response to a political scandal involving Senate Majority Leader (and former acting Lieutenant Governor) Arthur Wicks, Governor Thomas E. Dewey requested that the Legislature implement the Special Legislative Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in Government, which was successfully established in 1953.
1954: Governor Dewey and the First Code of Ethics
In 1954, Governor Dewey brought about enactment of the predecessor to current Public Officers Law § 74, the Code of Ethics, which applied to executive branch and legislative employees (although not legislators). During this time, the Legislature also enacted a new Public Officers Law § 73. Enforcement was vested in the Attorney General, who was also charged with establishing an Advisory Committee on Ethical Standards to provide ethical guidance to state officers and employees.
1962: Moreland Act Commission
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller established a Moreland Act Commission to investigate corruption and misconduct in government. Despite his efforts, no legislation or resignations resulted. However, the investigation prompted Governor Rockefeller to urge the Legislature to review any existing legislative code of ethics, identify conflicts of interest, and generally make recommendations in the area of legislative ethics.
1964: The Special Committee on Ethics
In 1964, Governor Rockefeller’s suggestions led to the creation of the Special Committee on Ethics, abolishing the Special Legislative Committee on Integrity and Ethical Standards in Government. The Committee had one task: to develop recommendations on ethics reform for the Legislature. The Committee, which was disbanded once its recommendations were published, played a crucial role in bringing about passage of legislation that required legislators to report their interests in state regulated businesses and reaffirmed the existing law prohibiting seeking or accepting gifts. The legislation also established a legislative ethics committee in each chamber of the Legislature, created a separate code of ethics for legislators, and mandated certain financial disclosures.
1975: Governor Hugh Carey and the Board of Public Disclosure
Governor Hugh Carey began mandating financial disclosure in 1975 after enacting Executive Order 10. The Order required policymakers (as determined by the Governor) and exempt non-competitive or unclassified State employees earning $30,000 per year or more[1], and such other State officers whom he appointed or nominated, to file financial disclosure statements via a form. The Order also established the Board of Public Disclosure, which consisted of seven members: the Secretary of State, Secretary to the Governor, Counsel to the Governor, and four others (who could not be holders of any public office), one of whom the Governor would designate as chair.
[1] In Evans v. Carey, 40 NY2d 1008 (1976), the Court of Appeals rejected the claim that the financial disclosure requirements and outside activity restrictions and prohibitions embodied in Executive Order 10 were unconstitutional. Two years later, however, in Rapp v. Carey, 44 NY2d 157 (9178), involving a successor, and somewhat broader-reaching iteration of Executive Order 10, the Court of Appeals held that absent empowering legislation, the governor could not constitutionally impose those requirements and outside activity restrictions and prohibitions except upon officers and government employees other than those appointed or nominated by the governor or subject to summary dismissal by him.
1986: The State-City Commission on Government Integrity
After revoking Governor Carey’s Executive Order 1030 and re-establishing the Board of Public Disclosure under new parameters, Governor Mario Cuomo and New York City Mayor Ed Koch established the State-City Commission on Government Integrity in 1986. The recommendations from the State-City Commission on Government Integrity resulted in the establishment of the Feerick Commission. The Feerick Commission was tasked with investigating the adequacy of laws, regulations, and procedures relating to maintaining ethical practices and standards in government.
1987: The State Ethics Commission and the Legislative Ethics Committee
A major result of the work of the Feerick Commission was the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act and New York State Governmental Accountability, Audit, and Internal Control Act of 1987. The Ethics in Government Act established the State Ethics Commission for all executive branch employees and the Legislative Ethics Committee for legislative branch employees and legislators. The State Ethics Commission had the power to receive complaints, initiate investigations, issue subpoenas, and refer matters to prosecutors.
2007: Commission on Public Integrity
The Public Employees Ethics Reform Act of 2007 (PEERA) was signed into law by former Governor Spitzer on March 26, 2007. PEERA created a new Commission on Public Integrity by merging the Temporary State Commission on Lobbying and the State Ethics Commission. Prior to the Temporary State Commission on Lobbying, state lobbying oversight was vested in the Department of State. The Commission on Public Integrity had 13 members, with seven appointed by the Governor, one by each legislative leader, one by the State Comptroller, and one by the Attorney General.
2011: Joint Commission on Public Ethics
The Public Integrity Reform Act of 2011 (PIRA) became effective on August 15, 2011, after being signed into law by former Governor Andrew Cuomo. PIRA, replacing PEERA, transferred authority from the Commission on Public Integrity to the newly titled Joint Commission on Public Ethics (JCOPE). JCOPE was the first ethics agency in New York State history to regulate both the executive and legislative branches and had 14 Commissioners, appointed as follows: three appointed by the Temporary President of the Senate; three appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly; one appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate; one appointed by the Minority Leader of the Assembly; and six appointed by the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor.
2013: Moreland Commission
In 2013, former Governor Cuomo used powers derived from the Moreland Act of 1907 to create the Commission to Investigate Public Corruption, commonly known as the Moreland Commission. The Commission was created in an attempt to root out corruption in state politics by pursuing cases of misconduct among public officials and recommending changes to the state’s election and campaign fund-raising laws. The Commission to Investigate Public Corruption was abruptly disbanded halfway through what would have been an 18-month life.
2022: Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government
Governor Kathy Hochul signed the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022 (ECRA) into law on April 9, 2022. ECRA repealed operative provisions of the Public Integrity Reform Act of 2011 and established the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government (COELIG) to replace JCOPE. COELIG is an 11-member Commission in which nominees must be approved by the Independent Review Committee (IRC), which is composed of the deans of the 15 accredited New York state law schools. Commissioners are appointed as follows: three by the Governor, two by the Senate President and Majority Leader, one by the Senate Minority Leader, two by the Assembly Speaker, one by the Assembly Minority Leader, one by the State Comptroller, and one by the Attorney General.
ECRA expanded ethics training requirements to mandate live comprehensive ethics training for the entire state executive workforce, legislature, and legislative employees - more than 320,000 individuals - biennially with refresher online training in intervening years. ECRA also extended the Commission's ethics and enforcement jurisdiction over state employees for two years after separation from state government service and over lobbyists, their clients, and related actors for two years after their last due filing or lobbying activity. In addition, ECRA removed special voting requirements for investigative and enforcement matters and allows such matters to be “elevated” into formal investigations on the initiative of staff or the Commission and to be advanced to hearing or other disposition by a simple majority vote of Commissioners. ECRA also called for the new Commission to review pending inquiries and matters and to establish policies to address them.
In April 2023, former governor Andrew M. Cuomo, seeking to prevent the Commission from moving forward with an enforcement proceeding JCOPE had commenced against him that the Commission was continuing, filed a lawsuit against COELIG contending, among other things, that the absence of gubernatorial control over the appointment and removal of a majority of commissioners, and the interposition of the Independent Review Committee into the commissioner confirmation process, violated the separation of powers doctrine.
On September 11, 2023, Supreme Court, Albany County, held that there were constitutional deficiencies in the way the Commission was structured and in the process for appointing Commissioners because the Governor was given insufficient control over the agency and was without the authority to remove the chair or a majority of commissioners if she is not satisfied with the Commission’s performance of its duties.
The Commission appealed that ruling to the Appellate Division, Third Department, also seeking and obtaining from the appellate court a partial stay of Supreme Court’s order during the pendency of the appeal, which was granted, and enabled the Commission to conduct all its operations and perform all its duties, holding in abeyance only the enforcement proceeding against the former governor.
On May 9, 2024, the Appellate Division, in a six-page decision, affirmed the lower Court’s ruling. Subsequently, that court granted the Commission’s motion for permission to appeal its ruling to the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, which by operation of law extended the previously entered stay.
On February 18, 2025, in a seminal ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the Third Department and held that former Governor Cuomo had failed to demonstrate that ECRA is facially unconstitutional.
As the Court wrote:
In New York, . . . the Legislature—not the Governor—may ordinarily define the terms on which non-constitutional state officers may be appointed and removed. Moreover, the Legislature structured the Commission to address a narrow but crucial gap arising from the inherent disincentive for the Executive Branch to investigate and discipline itself, which has serious consequences for public confidence in government. The Act does not displace the Executive Branch to accomplish that goal; instead, it confers upon an independent agency power to enforce a narrow set of laws, thus mitigating the unique danger of self-regulation. The Act addresses a threat to the legitimacy of government itself with an extraordinary response. While the Act extends very close to the boundary of permissible legislation, it is not “intrinsically a constitutional affront to the separation of powers doctrine…”
With respect to the former governor’s specific contentions, the Court held:
• New York’s separation of powers doctrine is “flexible” and “commonsense,” “allowing for some overlap among the coordinate branches of government”;
• the governor does not have “sole and unlimited powers to appoint or remove state officers because [New York’s constitution] disperses those powers between the Legislature and Governor”; and
• “the integrity of our constitutional design depends on the public’s trust in government, and [ECRA] provides an additional enforcement mechanism narrowly targeted to the problems in the Executive Branch’s self-regulation. [ECRA] addresses a threat to the legitimacy of government itself with an extraordinary response.”
The enactment of ECRA and the investment of the Commission with the duty and power to enforce the state’s ethics laws were, thus, valid exercises of legislative and executive authority and not an improper encroachment upon executive authority, for New York’s constitution does not prohibit the political branches in such circumstances from establishing an ethics commission that is not under the complete domination of either branch:
“Given the danger of self-regulation, the Legislature and the Governor have determined that there is an urgent need for the robust, impartial enforcement of the State’s ethics and lobbying laws. That task is assigned to the Commission. Neither the Legislature nor the Executive Branch has undue influence over the Commission, a structural characteristic lawfully chosen to ensure the integrity of the Commissioners and to instill public faith in government. Finally, the Legislature has not otherwise encroached upon the exclusive constitutional purview of the Executive Branch.”
The former Governor’s remaining contentions, that COELIG’s placement in the Department of State violated Article V of the state constitution and that the assertion of its authority against him trenched upon the Legislature’s impeachment power, were summarily rejected by the Court.
Sources:
https://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20070214/
https://ethics.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2017/11/jcope-third-year-report-final.pdf
https://www.albanylaw.edu/government-law-center/explaining-the-ethics-commission-reform-act-2022